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ABSTRACT 
The groundnut sector is the largest of Senegal’s agricultural sectors.  It has been subject to various 
degrees of intervention since the country’s independence. Some, including the determination of farm 
prices by the government have survived the wave of reforms of the 1980s.  Groundnut pricing policies 
have been the source of major transfers from farmers to the groundnut milling industry, which until 2007, 
was dominated by SONACOS, a publicly owned parastatal. The state was thus a major beneficiary of the 
transfers. In 2007, the company was privatized and is now privately owned, raising even greater concerns 
about the distribution of implications of pricing policies for groundnuts. 
The paper examines the potential ramifications of liberalizing groundnut prices in terms of its 
impact on prices received by producers and paid by the milling industry.  One fundamental question in the 
analysis is the extent to which local markets would respond to such a move. To answer this question, the 
paper presents a dynamic model of price formation that uses estimates of spatial integration across local 
markets to measure the response of local agricultural prices to policy changes. We then apply this model 
to simulate the impact of liberalizing groundnut prices to allow domestic prices to reflect their 
international levels. We find that doing so would change prices in the border city of Dakar, which 
happens to be the central market that determines prices in the local markets of the producing regions of 
Kaolack and Fatick. We also find that if markets had been fully liberalized when SONACOS was 
privatized in January 2007, then groundnut prices would have been higher and that the increase in prices 
would have been passed on almost entirely to producers in Kaolack and, to a lesser extent, to producers in 
Fatick. Such reforms would have reversed the longstanding discrimination of groundnut farmers. Prices 
received by farmers in Kaolack over a period of one year would have increased from 352 FCFA/kg to 494 
FCFA/kg of shelled groundnuts. For farmers in the Fatick region, prices would increase from 389 
FCFA/kg to 474 FCFA/kg. 






  1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Senegalese agriculture is unusually specialized in just three products: groundnuts, rice, and millet. 
Groundnuts have remained Senegal’s premier export crop, rice remains the principle importable food, and 
millet is the principal food crop (Masters 2007). Senegal has been considered one of the most highly 
controlled markets in West Africa (Masters 2007). Historically, the Senegalese government has 
maintained a monopoly both on the purchase of groundnuts and on processing them into oil. At the 
beginning of the season, the government would set one producer price for groundnuts throughout the 
country. Accepting this pan-territorial price, farmers were required to sell their groundnuts to official 
agencies. Since the cost of transporting the groundnuts from the collection points near the villages to the 
mill was borne by the government or its parastatal groundnut agency (la Société Nationale de 
Commercialisation des Oléagineux du Sénégal [SONACOS]), every farmer received the same price, 
regardless of how far the farm was from the groundnut mill (Gray 2002).  
Government control of the groundnut market has led to distortions that create a gap between 
domestic prices and what those prices would be under free markets (Masters 2007). One estimate for 
marketing year 2001–2002 suggested that, given all of SONACOS’s procurement costs, its tradable 
inputs were subsidized at a rate of about 23 percent, which more than offset the 8.5 percent premiums it 
paid on nontradable factors, such as labor. This rate was also much larger than the 7.7 percent implicit 
subsidy that SONACOS received from protection on it sales. The net effect was a substantial transfer to 
SONACOS, amounting to 20 percent of the firm’s market revenue (Masters 2007). 
In recent years, the Senegalese government has attempted to liberalize the groundnut market. 
SONACOS was privatized in 2007 to encourage a further expansion of the open market. One fundamental 
question that faces policymakers undertaking economic reform is the extent to which local markets 
respond to sectoral and macroeconomic policy changes. It is recognized that the response of agricultural 
producers to sectoral, trade, and macroeconomic policies depends upon the extent to which local market 
prices respond to changes in central market prices. It is thus necessary to have an idea of the relative 
isolation of rural markets and the implications thereof for agricultural producers. A second question is 
what would happen to groundnut prices if the marketing of groundnuts were fully liberalized—that is, if 
domestic prices actually reflected their international levels. In particular, answering this second question 
would indicate how much of the distortions to the groundnut market have remained since the privatization 
of the publicly owned SONACOS, which has now become a privately owned company SUNEOR.  
To answer both questions, this paper presents a dynamic model of price formation that uses 
estimates of spatial integration across local markets to measure the response of local agricultural prices to 
policy changes. We then apply this model to simulate the impact of the liberalization of groundnut prices 
in Senegal, allowing domestic prices to reflect their international levels. Our findings show that Dakar is 
the central market that determines prices in the local markets of Kaolack and Fatick. We also find that if 
markets had been fully liberalized when SONACOS was privatized in January 2007, then groundnut 
prices would have been higher. In addition, this increase in prices would have been passed on almost 
entirely to producers in Kaolack and, to a lesser extent, to producers in Fatick. In combination, these 
findings suggest that local prices would respond to price reforms initiated in Dakar (the central market) 
and that distortions to the groundnut market continue to exist after the transition from SONACOS to 
SUNEOR.  
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2.  METHODOLGY
1 
The contemporaneous relationship between the local and central market prices—𝑃? and 𝑃𝐶, 




?  (1) 




?,  (2) 
where 𝑇? is the cost of arbitrage between the local and central markets. To capture the dynamic nature of 
the relationship between prices in the two markets, a fully specified dynamic model needs to be used. In 
this price adjustment model, the relationship between the prices in two markets is given by  
𝑃?
? =   ??𝑃?−?
? +   ??𝑃?−?




?=1   (3) 
In equation (3), in a local market for groundnuts,  , the price is determined by the price in a reference (or 
central) market, 𝐶.; ? is used to indicate lags; and ? denotes a matrix that includes an intercept, a time 
trend, seasonal dummies, and other variables. If ?? = 0 ∀ ? (for all ?), then the local market is segmented 
from the central market—that is, the local market operates independently from the central market, and 
policy-induced changes in the latter are not transmitted to the former. In contrast if ?0 = 1, then price 
changes are immediately transmitted (at ? = 0) from the central market to the local market, and we have 
short-run market integration (Ravallion 1986). We will have lagged effects on future prices, unless?? =
?? = 0. If both ?0 = 1 and ?? = ?? = 0, then within one time period, the local market will be integrated 
with the central market. 




and; the number of lags required to ensure this equality provides evidence of integration that is less 
immediate than instantaneous price transmittal. The cumulative effect after ? periods of a central-market 
price shock on the price in an outlying market can be computed as  
  ??






ℎ=0  .  (4) 
In (4), the cumulative effect of a central-market price shock is given by the expected value of the local 
price at time ? + ℎ divided by the change in the central price at time ?. Complete adjustment of the 
process is given by the long-run dynamic multiplier:  
  ?𝐶,? = lim?→∞ ??
𝐶,?.  (5) 
The speed of price transmission can be calculated by computing the time 𝜏 that it takes for the 
intermediate multipliers to converge within a certain range of the long-run multiplier. The convergence 
rule is to find 𝜏 such that |?𝜏/? − 1| < ? and |βj/β − 1| < ? for every ? > 𝜏, where ? is a tolerance 
limit, and ?? is the estimated multiplier after ? periods. Approximating derivatives by first differences and 
defining as one period the   units of time required for the long-run multiplier to converge to its long-run 
value, equation (4) can be rewritten as 
                                                       
1 Annex A presents the derivation of the price time path in the context of a multimarket setting. See also Badiane (1997) and 
Badiane and Shively (1998).  
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  Δ𝑃?+1
? = ??Δ𝑃?
𝐶.  (6) 
Writing out equation (4), dropping the superscript on ? for the sake of notational simplicity, and inserting 
the values for 𝑃𝐶 from equation (2) yields2 
  𝑃?+2
? =  𝑃?+1
? + 𝑇?+1
?  ? −  𝑃?
? + 𝑇?
? ? + 𝑃?+1
? .  (7) 
Rearranged slightly, equation (7) yields a second-order linear difference equation that can be solved to 








? = Δ𝑇? .  (8) 





? + 𝜑?Δ𝑇?,  (9) 
where 𝜍? =
?−??
?−1 ; 𝜚? =
??−1
?−1 and 𝜑? =  
?
?−1 ?. 
Equation (9) expresses the local-market price at time ? as a function of the initial price, the long-run 
multiplier, and the change in arbitrage costs. In other words, changes in the degree of market integration 
or the cost of marketing not only affect local prices contemporaneously, but also affect the evolution of 
these prices over time. The expression for the time path of local prices derived here exposes the 
relationships between spatial integration among local markets, the cost of local arbitrage, and the 
adjustment of local prices to shocks in leading markets.  
                                                       














Then we have:  
𝑃?+2
? − 𝑃?+1
? = ? 𝑃?+1
? − 𝑃?
?  + ?(𝑇?+1
? − 𝑇?
?) 
Rearranging gives:  
𝑃?+2
? = ? 𝑃?+1
? + 𝑇?+1
?   − ? 𝑃?
? + 𝑇?
?  + 𝑃?+1
?   
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3.  DATA 
The methodology set out in the previous section is applied to monthly retail prices for Dakar, Kaolack, 
and Fatick from January 1998 until December 2007 (120 observations). Figures 1a and 1b show the 
evolution of prices for shelled groundnuts. The spread between retail prices at Kaolack and Fatick 
markets and the consumer market of Dakar seems to have increased from about 2004 onward. 
Furthermore, prices appear to be moving upward together. 
Figure 1.a. Dakar-Kaolack retail margin  
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Note: FCFA = Franc Communautaire Financiere Africaine 
Figure 1.b. Dakar-Fatick retail margin  
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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4.  RESULTS 
To test the degree of market integration between the Dakar markets and the markets in Kaolack and 
Fatick, the two-step estimation method proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) can be applied. In the first 
step, price series in the individual markets are tested separately for their order of economic integration—
that is, the number of time a series needs to be differenced for it to become stationary. For that purpose, 
we used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller 1979). Table 1 shows that stationarity is 
rejected for all three markets at the 1 percent level—in other words, a unit root exists for the Dakar, 
Kaolack, and Fatick markets. All series are stationary at their first difference.  
Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
  Test statistic  1% critical value  5% critical value  10% critical value 
Dakar  –1.739  –3.506  –2.889  –2.579 
Kaolack  –2.825       
Fatick  –2.993       
D1.Dakar  –7.414       
D1.Kaolack  –9.737       
D1.Fatick  –11.834       
Note: D1 stands for first differential 
Although the individiual series are not stationary, they are integrated of the same order. Thus, it is 
possible to test whether they are cointegrated. In the second step, the residual of the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression between a given pair of local price series, given by 
  𝑝?
? = ?0 + ?1𝑝?
? + 𝑧? ,  (10a) 
is in turn tested for stationarity, using the same Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. However, this time it is 
used  to  establish  the  stability  of  the  relationship  patterns  between  the  two  series.  The  presence  of 
cointegration between the two price series indicates interdependence between their respective markets. 
Results of the test are given in Table 2.  
Table 2. Ordinary least squares regression results 
     
  Groundnut price Kaolack   
Groundnut price Dakar  0.80 (0.05)**   
Constant  14.85 (20.19)   
R-squared  0.73   
ADF (residuals)
a  –5.98  (MacKinnon p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000) 
     
  Groundnut price Fatick   
Groundnut price Dakar  0.73 (0.06)**   
Constant  95.09 (23.96)**   
R-squared  0.61   
ADF (residuals)  –5.83  (MacKinnon p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000) 
Notes: ** Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
a Augmented Dickey Fuller  
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Table 2 shows that for both regressions, residuals are stationary, indicating that a cointegrated 
relationship exists between the groundnut price on the Dakar retail market and the Kaolack and Fatick 
markets. The cointegrated linear combination is given by 
  𝑧?−1 = 𝑝?−1
? − ?0 − ?1𝑝?−1
? .  (10b) 
Once the presence of cointegration between two price series is established, the relationship between the 
two series can be represented as an error correction mechanism (ECM): 
  𝗥𝑝?
? = ??𝑧?−1 +   ??
? ?=??
?=1 Δ𝑝?−?




?   (11a) 
  𝗥𝑝?
? = ??𝑧?−1 +   ??
? ?=??
?=1 Δ𝑝?−?




?,   (11b) 
where Δ is the difference operator; ?? and ?? are the number of lags; and ?,?,and φ are parameters to 
be estimated. Causality from market ? to market ? can then be tested as follows: 
𝐻0?: ?? ≠ 0,𝜑ℎ
? = 0,ℎ = 1,2,…??, 
and causality from market ? to market ? can be tested as 
𝐻0?: ?? ≠ 0,??
? = 0,ℎ = 1,2,…??. 
Estimation results are given in Table 3. 
Table 3. Error correction mechanism estimation results 
  Kaolack–Dakar groundnut markets 
  Δ Groundnut price in Kaolack    Δ Groundnut price in Dakar 
??  –0.33 (0.10)**  ??   –0.07 (0.08) 
??
?    0.10 (0.12)  ??
?   0.11 (0.10) 
𝝋?
?   0.18 (0.13)  𝝋?
?    0.27 (0.09)** 
Constant  0.70 (3.87)  Constant  –1.00 (2.85) 
R-squared  0.13  R-squared  0.16 
Number of observations  117     
  Fatick–Dakar groundnut markets 
  Δ Groundnut price in Fatick    Δ Groundnut price in Dakar 
??   –0.38 (0.10)**  ??   0.06 (0.07) 
??
?     0.09 (0.10)  ??
?   0.03 (0.07) 
𝝋?
?     0.18 (0.13)  𝝋?
?          0.32 (0.10) ** 
Constant  –0.88 (4.16)  Constant   0.60 (3.32) 
R-squared  0.15  R-squared  0.12 
Number of observations  117     
Note: ** Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Table 3 shows that causality exists from the Dakar market to the Kaolack and Fatick markets but 
that the reverse does not hold. Dakar can thus be considered the central market.  
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5.  DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENTS 
Cointegration analysis helps us establish whether a systematic relationship exists between two economic 
time series. However, it does not provide any information on (a) the strength of the relationship between 
the price series of the considered pair of markets or (b) the length of time it takes for a shock to be 
transmitted from one market to another. For marketing policy purposes, it is important to be aware of the 
existence of long-term market interdependence and to have knowledge of the poles of market influence. It 
is also important to have an idea of the magnitude of this interdependence and the speed with which 
changes in the price system are transmitted across individual markets. This additional information allows 
for better interpretation of the consequences of changes in central markets in terms of the implication for 
price behavior in distant markets. Perfect market integration would be indicated if the price in one market 
were an exact translation of the price in another market, implying that price changes were fully 
transmitted between the two markets. Market segmentation, on the other hand, would be reflected in the 
absence of cointegration. In reality, however, perfect integration or segmentation are both extreme cases, 
with intermediate degrees of integration being the normal situation. The main issue thus becomes how to 
measure the magnitude of intermarket price transmission, which can be done by applying autoregressive 
techniques to price series in order to yield dynamic multipliers that can be used to measure the 
transmission of price changes.  
In the process of intermediate price transmission, the impacts of immediate shocks must be 
distinguished from their cumulative impact, which builds up over time. This step is necessary because the 
process of price transmission usually takes time and involves complex dynamic adjustments among 
individual markets. Analyzing the price adjustment process over time, using the convergence of dynamic 
multipliers, allows us to study the speed of price transmission—that is, the number of days, weeks, or 
months it takes for prices in one market to be transmitted fully or partially to other markets. Normally, the 
speed of cross-market price responses is determined by the distribution system’s efficiency and by the 
structural characteristics of local markets. Rapid adjustments reflect sufficient flexibility and 
responsiveness of the domestic marketing system. Furthermore, given the magnitude of price adjustment 
between two markets, the better integrated a given pair of markets are, the lower the amount of time it 
takes for the two markets to complete the adjustment to induced price shocks.  
We have established that Dakar is the central market and now want to know how groundnut 
prices in Kaolack and Fatick respond over time to a change in the groundnut price in Dakar. We analyze 
these dynamic causal effects within a distributed lag model. We take the percentage change in the 
groundnut price in Kaolack and Fatick as a dependent: 100∆lnP^(i, j). Price changes, rather than price 
levels, are the preferred unit of analysis. First differences of logarithm are taken because they offer an 
immediate interpretation in terms of percentage change. Figures 2a–2c show percentage price changes in 
Dakar, Kaolack, and Fatick, respectively. 8 
Figure 2a. Monthly percentage change in the price of shelled groundnuts for Dakar 
 
Figure 2b. Monthly percentage change in the price of shelled groundnuts for Kaolack  
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Figure 2c. Monthly percentage change in the price of shelled groundnuts for Fatick 
 
Autoregressive processes can be applied to prices in individual markets to obtain indicators for 
the magnitude and speed of the price transmission process across these markets. For every pair or market 
locations ? and ?, the following bivariate autoregressive process can be estimated: 
  %∆𝑝𝑡
? =   ??
? %Δ𝑝𝑡−?





?=1    (12) 
Ordinary least squares regression results of the estimation of (12) are given in Table 4.  
Table 4. Ordinary least squares regression results 
  % Δ prices in Kaolack  % Δ prices in Fatick 
% Δ prices in Dakar  0.61 (0.11)*  0.44 (0.10)* 
Constant  0.90 (0.91)  0.11 (0.80) 
R-squared  0.21  0.16 
Number of observations  117  115 
Note: * Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
The results in Table 4 show that a statistically significant, positive relation exists between 
groundnut prices in the central market of Dakar and those in the local markets of Kaolack and Fatick. A 
price increase in Dakar thus implies that prices in Kaolack and Fatick will also increase. In the estimation, 
problems of simultaneity may be encountered that are related to the contemporaneous use of prices in 
market ? and market ?. Since both prices may respond to the same shock, it is expected that the error term 
𝜀?,𝑡 will be correlated with the price 𝑝?,𝑡 . Following Mendoza and Farris (1992), the error term of 
equation (12) can be modeled as an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) process (see 
Engle 1982). The ARCH model specifies the contemporaneous conditional variance as a function of past 
square residuals. This specification captures the volatility clustering characteristics of price time series—
that is, the tendency of large residuals to be followed by large residuals and small residuals to be followed 
by small ones. The two lags—one for prices in market ? and one for prices in market ? ?—are determined 
simultaneously by application of the Akaike Information Criterion (results given in the appendix). 
According to this criterion, three lags should be included for Dakar and Kaolack and four for Dakar and 
Fatick.   
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The magnitude of price adjustment is estimated with dynamic multipliers, which are interpreted 
as the effect of a price change due to a random shock or a shift in an exogenous variable (Goletti and 
Christina-Tsigas 1995). In the context of the model introduced above, the cumulative effect of a shock to 
price in market ? on the price in market ? after ? periods is given in equations (4) and (5). The immediate 
impact of price 𝑝?
? and 𝑝?
? on the expected value of 𝑝?
? is given by 𝜕??𝑝?
?/𝜕𝑝?




?. For subsequent periods, the effect of a shock to the price in market ? on the price in market ? is given 
by  








? ,? = 1,2,….
? ?? (??,?)
?=0                                     (13a) 
The effect of a shock to the price in market ? at time ? on the price in market ? for subsequent periods is 









? ,ℎ = 1,2,….
? ?? (??,ℎ)
?=1    (13b) 













?  .  (14) 
Estimation results for the ARCH and the resulting cumulative dynamic multipliers are given in Table 5.  
Table 5. Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity estimation results 
  % Δ prices in Kaolack  % Δ prices in Fatick 
% Δ prices in Dakar  0.77 (0.11)
a**  0.54 (0.11)** 
L1. % Δ prices Dakar  0.15 (0.15)  0.09 (0.12) 
L2. % Δ prices in Dakar  0.34 (0.12)**  0.32 (0.13)** 
L3. % Δ prices in Dakar  0.32 (0.17)*  0.01(0.13) 
L4. % Δ prices in Dakar    0.11 (0.13) 
L1. % Δ prices in Kaolack  –0.21 (0.10)**   
L2. % Δ prices in Kaolack  –0.22 (0.08)**   
L3. % Δ prices in Kaolack  –0.28 (0.09)**   
L1. % Δ prices in Fatick    –0.20 (0.07)** 
L2. % Δ prices in Fatick    –0.20 (0.08)** 
L3. % Δ prices in Fatick    –0.25 (0.08)** 
L4. % Δ prices in Fatick    –0.24 (0.09)** 
Constant  0.86 (0.90)  0.19 (0.81) 
Long-run dynamic multiplier  0.92  0.57 
Notes:
 a OPG  (outer product of the gradient) standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
** Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
L stands for the lag operator. 
                                                       
3 The long-run equilibrium is given by the unconditional expectations or the expected value of 𝑝?
? .  
Let 𝑝∗? = (𝑝??) and 𝑝∗? = (𝑝??) for all ?. If the two processes moved together without error,  then in the long-run they would 
converge to 𝑝∗? = ?0? + ?1?𝑝∗? + …. ?ℎ?𝑝∗? + ?0?𝑝∗? + ?1?𝑝∗? + … ???𝑝∗?. Solving for 𝑝∗
? , we get  
𝑝∗? = ?0? + ?1? + … ???1 − ?1? − ∙∙∙ ?ℎ?𝑝∗? + ?0?1 − ?1? − … ?ℎ?.  
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Figure 3a. Long-run adjustments of prices in Fatick to a shock in Dakar 
 
Notes: CI stands for confidence interval, cdm stands for cumulative dynamic multiplier 
Figure 3b. Long-run adjustments of prices in Kaolack to a shock in Dakar 
 
Notes: CI stands for confidence interval, cdm stands for cumulative dynamic multiplier 
In addition to knowing the magnitude of the total effect of a shock as measured by the long-run 
multiplier, it is often useful to know how many periods it takes for some portion of a shock’s total effect 
to dissipate or how much of the shock has dissipated after some number of periods. Table 5 shows that 
the long-run dynamic multiplier is 0.92 for Kaolack, implying that a price shock to the Dakar groundnut 
market is almost fully transmitted to the Kaolack market. However, for the Fatick market, the multiplier is 
only 0.57, implying that only about half of the price shock in Dakar is transmitted to Fatick. Results from  
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Table 5 show that 77 percent and 54 percent of the total price shock in Dakar is immediately transmitted 
to the Kaolack and Fatick markets, respectively. 
Based on this information, we can calculate the effect of liberalization of the groundnut market. 
Liberalization implies that the world market price for groundnuts will become the groundnut price in 
Dakar. The peanut sector is still dominated by SUNEOR, which took over from SONACOS (Société 
Nationale de Commercialisation des Oléagineux du Sénégal), which was created in 1965 with a mission 
to evict private operators from the processing sector and to give the government control over the most 
important section of the country’s nascent industry. As of January 1, 2007, SONACOS has been renamed 
SUNEOR, thus marking the end of the privatization process that started in 2004, when the government 
decided to sell its shares to Advens, a private consortium, including private investors,, the Belgian peanut 
machinery manufacturer Desmet, SODEFITEX (Senegal’s cotton ginning company), and SONACOS 
employees. 
Table 6. Data used for estimating the time path of prices in Kaolack and Fatick 



















(t=1)  Kaolack  Fatick  Kaolack  Fatick 
453  352  389  601  493  474  0.92  0.57  –0.47  –0.47 
Note: Given the difficulties in getting information on the actual cost of marketing or arbitrage, the observed average margin 
between prices in Dakar and Kaolack and between Dakar and Fatick is used as a proxy. 
a Average pre-liberalization price of shelled groundnuts in Dakar for 2004–2006 
b Calculated as the pre-liberalization price of shelled groundnuts in Dakar minus the average marketing costs between Kaolack 
and Dakar for 2004–2006, which is 101 CFA/kg 
c Calculated as the pre-liberalization price of shelled groundnuts in Dakar minus the average marketing costs between Fatick and 
Dakar for 2004–2006, which is 64 CFA/kg 
d Average world market price for 2006–2008 applied to Dakar in January 2007 
e Simulated prices for Kaolack after full adjustments, assuming a complete liberalization of the market on January 1, 2007  
f Simulated prices for Fatick after full adjustments, assuming a complete liberalization of the market on January 1, 2007 
The Dakar price at time ? = 0 is the average price for the three years before liberalization (2004–
2006), which is 453 CFA Francs/kg. A shock is introduced by allowing Dakar prices to adjust to world 
market prices. Thus, at ? = 1, the new price in Dakar becomes 𝑃?=1 = 𝑃? ∗ ? + 𝑇, where 𝑃? is the 
world market price for shelled groundnuts available from Oil World (U.S. runners), ? is the exchange 
rate, and 𝑇 is tariffs. World market prices for shelled groundnuts, as well as prices in the Dakar, Kaolack, 
and Fatick markets, are given in Figure 4.  
Assuming tariffs are 0 and using guided adjustment, the price in Dakar will jump from 453 
CFA/kg to 601 CFA/kg, which is the 2006–2008 average world market price for shelled groundnuts. 
Given the shock to prices in Dakar, the prices in Kaolack and Fatick can be calculated based on equation 
(9). The local price in each of these markets at t = 0 is 352 CFA/kg for Kaolack and 389 CFA/kg for 
Fatick (see Table 6). Between 1998 and 2007, arbitrage costs between Dakar and Kaolack and between 
Dakar and Fatick fell by an average of 0.47 FCFA per month. Figure 5 displays the time path of prices in 
Kaolack and Fatick resulting from a liberalization of the groundnut markets in January 2007 as the 
multiplier converges to its long-run equilibrium. The lines describe the evolution toward the long-run 
equilibrium after a shock to the observed average pre-reform observed price in Kaolack and Fatick 
between 2004 and 2006. Prices in Fatick overshot their long-run level, whereas prices in Kaolack initially 
undershot and then adjusted upward from the third-period onward.  
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Figure 4. Shelled groundnut price (FCFA/kg) 
  
Note: FCFA = Franc Communautaire Financiere Africaine 
Figure 5. The time path of price adjustment in Kaolack and Fatick   
  
Note:  The figure shows prices that would have prevailed, had the government liberalized grourndnut prices to reflect world 
market prices at the time of the privatization of SONACOS. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Table 6 presents the prices used in the simulation and explains how they were derived. The 
simulations were carried out for the year 2007. For this period, the effects of the reforms were simulated 
by adjusting the prices in Dakar for January 2007 (PD’d(t = 1/07) = 601), assuming that an effective 
liberalization would have increased them to the level of average world prices between 2006 and 2008. 
With an average transfer cost between Dakar and Kaolack of 101 CFA/kg, the initial price in Kaolack can 
be calculated using equations (9) and (10).  
In Figures 6a and 6b, the front axis shows the distribution of the impact of policy changes across 
local markets as a function of the level of market integration. The Y-axis shows the level of prices, the X-
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period of one year, prices would increase from 352 FCFA/kg to 494 FCFA/kg. For Fatick (Figure 6b), 
which has a lower level of integration with Dakar, the price increases by less—from 389 FCFA/kg to 474 
FCFA/kg. 
Figure 6a. Market integration and the dynamics of price transmission in Kaolack 
  
Figure 6b. Market integration and the dynamics of price transmission in Fatick 
  
Figures 6a and 6b illustrate some of the additional information that the proposed model adds to 
the traditional analysis of market integration. The proposed model shows the cost of market segmentation 
and the benefits of improving market integration in terms of the potential impact at the local level of 
policy reforms. Not only does it show how the level of market integration affects the short-term 
geographic distribution of the impact of policy changes, but it also shows how that impact evolves over 
time in individual markets. Following liberalization, if no complementary measures are adopted to 
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between the two markets can be expected to proceed with its ―normal‖ rate of change to a value of 
𝜇?
? = 0.92 for Kaolack and 𝜇?
? = 0.57 for Fatick, with a corresponding change in the price level of 𝑝?  
and 𝑝?, respectively, in the end period.  
Figures 6a and 6b clearly show that adopting measures to improve market integration would raise 
the price level in the final period. 
The above analysis demonstrates that world market prices are higher than those that have 
currently prevailed in the market since privatization of SONACOS. A liberalization of groundnut prices 
would thus increase market prices, and this price increase would almost entirely be passed on to farmers 
in Kaolack and, for a large part, to farmers in Fatick. By keeping groundnut prices fixed after 
privatization of SONACOS, the Senegalese government is actually implicitly subsidizing its new private 
owners to the disadvantage of groundnut farmers. Therefore, liberalization of these policies should be 
expected to redistribute transfers in favor of producers. The liberalization of groundnut prices alone 
would not yield much benefit, unless the tightly controlled marketing systems are also reformed to allow 
competition between traders in the informal and formal sectors, including procurement by the milling 
industry. In particular, the practice of licensing selected private traders (operateurs prives), 
administratively determining the marketing season, and occasionally interdicting movement by informal 
traders would have to be eliminated.  Otherwise, a significant part, if not all, of the rent arising for the 
higher border prices would be captured by other actors along the chain to the detriment of farmers. 
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table A.1a. OLS regression of price change in Dakar on price change in Kaolack 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     116 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   114) =   32.94 
       Model |  3146.18945     1  3146.18945           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  10889.0964   114  95.5183898           R-squared     =  0.2242 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2174 
       Total |  14035.2859   115  122.045964           Root MSE      =  9.7734 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    chkaoret |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    chdakret |   .6635419   .1156164     5.74   0.000     .4345067    .8925771 
       _cons |   .9963464   .9078696     1.10   0.275    -.8021363    2.794829 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table A.1b. OLS regression of price change in Dakar on price change in Fatick  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     116 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   114) =   17.24 
       Model |  1775.17353     1  1775.17353           Prob > F      =  0.0001 
    Residual |  11741.3915   114  102.994662           R-squared     =  0.1313 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1237 
       Total |   13516.565   115  117.535348           Root MSE      =  10.149 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    chfatret |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    chdakret |   .4972412   .1197716     4.15   0.000     .2599745    .7345079 
       _cons |   .1143391   .9430132     0.12   0.904    -1.753763    1.982441 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
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Table A.2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       118 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)            -10.343            -3.504            -2.889            -2.579 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller chdakret 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       118 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -7.863            -3.504            -2.889            -2.579 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller chfatret 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       118 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)            -13.555            -3.504            -2.889            -2.579 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
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Table A.3. Determination of number of lags for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
varsoc chfatret chdakret if ex63 & ex31, maxlag(8) 
 
   Selection-order criteria 
   Sample:  1998m10 - 2007m12, but with gaps    Number of obs      =       108 
  +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |lag |    LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC    | 
  |----+----------------------------------------------------------------------| 
  |  0 | -783.638                      7137.36   14.5489    14.569   14.5985* | 
  |  1 | -778.448  10.381    4  0.034  6981.95   14.5268   14.5872   14.6758  | 
  |  2 | -768.735  19.426    4  0.001  6281.69    14.421   14.5217   14.6694  | 
  |  3 | -763.351  10.768    4  0.029  6124.14   14.3954   14.5364   14.7431  | 
  |  4 |  -757.82  11.062    4  0.026   5955.4    14.367   14.5483   14.8141  | 
  |  5 | -748.187  19.265    4  0.001  5368.97*  14.2627   14.4843*  14.8091  | 
  |  6 | -746.941  2.4921    4  0.646  5655.13   14.3137   14.5755   14.9594  | 
  |  7 | -741.019  11.845    4  0.019  5464.26   14.2781   14.5802   15.0232  | 
  |  8 | -736.123   9.791*   4  0.044  5383.35   14.2615*  14.6039   15.1059  | 
  +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
   Endogenous:  chfatret chdakret 
    Exogenous:  _cons 
 
varsoc chkaoret chdakret, maxlag(8) 
 
   Selection-order criteria 
   Sample:  1998m10 - 2007m12                   Number of obs      =       111 
  +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |lag |    LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC    | 
  |----+----------------------------------------------------------------------| 
  |  0 | -822.376                      9680.43   14.8536   14.8734   14.9024  | 
  |  1 | -810.588  23.576    4  0.000  8413.25   14.7133   14.7727   14.8598* | 
  |  2 |  -803.72  13.735    4  0.008  7990.35   14.6616   14.7606*  14.9057  | 
  |  3 | -798.328  10.784    4  0.029   7794.1*  14.6365*  14.7752   14.9783  | 
  |  4 | -797.027  2.6011    4  0.627  8185.66   14.6852   14.8634   15.1246  | 
  |  5 |  -791.79  10.475    4  0.033  8009.89   14.6629   14.8807   15.1999  | 
  |  6 | -787.209  9.1627    4  0.057   7933.2   14.6524   14.9099   15.2871  | 
  |  7 | -785.421  3.5752    4  0.467  8265.47   14.6923   14.9893   15.4246  | 
  |  8 | -779.091   12.66*   4  0.013   7937.8   14.6503    14.987   15.4802  | 
  +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
   Endogenous:  chkaoret chdakret 
    Exogenous:  _cons 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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APPENDIX B:  DERIVATION OF THE TIME PATH OF LOCAL PRICE 
ADJUSTMENTS FOR MULTIPLE MARKETS 
Following Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand (2001), consider an  1  n nonstationary   1 I  vector of prices, 
  nt t t t p p p P ,..., , 2 1  , where  it p is the price of a commodity at time t in market i. Suppose that t P  can be 
decomposed into two components, as follows, 
  t t s n t P f A P
~
   ,  (B1) 
where  t f  is an  1  s vector of s (s < n) common unit root factors, and  t P
~
is an  1  n  vector of stationary 
components. Every element in the vector  t P  can be explained by a linear combination of a smaller 
number of    1 I  common factors  jt f
 
(permanent component) plus an    0 I  transitory component. In the 
long run, the variables  it p  move together, because they share the same stochastic trends. 
Equation (B2) is known as the common factor representation, and its existence is guaranteed if 
and only if there are  s n  cointegrating vectors among the elements of vector t P . As shown before, any 
cointegrated system can be written as a vector error correction (VEC) model: 
 
t p t p t t t t P P P P P                        1 1 2 2 1 1 1 ...
,  (B2) 
where  and  are  n n  matrices and  has reduced rank  s n  . The matrix   can be written as 
     , where  is an    s n n    matrix of coefficients and  is an    s n n    matrix of 
cointegrating vectors. Thus,  1 1 1        t t t Z P P    , with  1 1     t t P Z  being the error correction term 
(or the short-run disequilibrium) and with  being the matrix of adjustment coefficients. The element of 
matrix  cancel the common unit roots in  t P  and, in the long run, link the movements of the elements of 
t P . 
After estimation, a typical VEC model takes the form 
 
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 ö ... ö ö ö ö                     k t p t t t t P P P P P 
.  (B3) 











k jt jk jt j i it p p p
1 1
1 ö   
































1 1 ö    
.  (B5) 




. In other words, in the long run, 




?=1   (B6) 
or 




?=1 .  (B7)  
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At equilibrium, 
 
jt ijt it p T p  
,  (B8) 
where  ijt T is the transportation or transaction cost between locations i and j at period t. For k = 1, it 
follows that 




.  (B9) 
After rearranging and grouping some terms, equation (B9) yields 
  𝑝??+2 −  1 +   ??1
?
?=1  𝑝??+1 +    ??1
?









? 𝑝??+1 + 𝑝? = ΔT  t, 
where ? =   ??1
?






?=1   . 
Application 
Table B.1. Determination of maximum lag
a 
Lag  FPE  AIC  HQIC  SBIC 
0  0.00001  –2.99  –2.96  –2.92 




b  –5.33  –5.13  –4.83 
3  9.7e-07  –5.33  –5.04  –4.62 
4  9.7e-07  –5.33
b  –4.96  –4.41 
Note‖
 aFinal prediction error (FPE), Akaike's information criterion (AIC), Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and 
the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC). 
b Maximum lag 
As shown in Table B.1, the maximum number of lags to be included varies, depending on the 
statistic used; it is 4 when using AIC, and 2 with HQIC and SBIC. Therefore, we decided to run 
Johansen’s integration test for both lags. The results (see Table B.2) suggest the existence of two 
cointegrating vectors for both max lambda and trace statistics. In other words, following Gonzalez-Rivera 
and Helfand (2001), the three markets share the same long-run characteristics and thus constitute a 
genuine integrated market. However, for a maximum lag of 4, the existence of integration is established 
only with intercept in the VAR.  
Table B.2. Cointegration results 
  Value statistics    Osterwald-Lenum critical values (95% interval) 
  Lag = 2  Lag = 4    With intercept in CE  With intercept in VAR 
Rank 
Maximum 
lambda  Trace 
Maximum 
lambda  Trace  H0 
Maximum 
lambda  Trace 
Maximum 
lambda  Trace 
0  35.4  63.1  30.6  52.5  0  22.0  34.9  21.0  29.7 
1  17.5  27.7  15.8  21.9  1  15.7  20.0  14.1  15.4 
2  10.2  10.2  6.1  6.1  2  9.2  9.2  3.8  3.8  
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To identify an exogenous central market, Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand (2001) suggested the 
following test of weak exogeneity: 𝐻0: ??? = 0,∀ ? = 1,…,? − 1 . Results are reported in Table B.3. 
Table B.3. Estimation results of vector error correction (lag = 2 and rank = 2) 
Dakar 
 













































Note: *, **, and *** mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Table B.3 shows that in the short term, the Dakar market does not adjust to either Kaolack or 
Fatick, thus confirming that Dakar is indeed the central market. On the reverse, both Kaolack and Fatick 
significantly adjust to short-term disequilibrium.  
Table B.4. Simulation data for the time path of price adjustment 
  Dakar  Kaolack  Fatick 
p0  500  475  575 
p1  754  680  693 
Gamma: ?  ??       
Dakar  0.183  0.137  0.239 
Kaolack  0.203  0.166  0.1 
Fatick  –0.063  –0.039  –0.044 
Sum of gamma (?  ?)  0.323  0.264  0.295 
Trans at t = 2       
Dakar  —  54.8  62.5 
Kaolack  –54.8  —  7.7 
Fatick  –62.5  –7.7  — 
∆𝑇  ?  –22.3  35.6  20.0 
With no transaction cost among the three markets, prices are expected to jump immediately after 
privatization, though they will remain stable afterward (see Figure B.1). The price of groundnuts in Dakar 
will also stay above prices for groundnuts in Kaolack and Fatick. However, with transaction costs, 
simulation results exhibit an upward trend for prices in Dakar, while prices in Kaolack and Fatick are 
expected to decline after a short increase following the reform (see Figure B.2).   
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Figure B.1. Price time path with no transaction cost between Dakar and Kaolack  
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